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SUMMARY OF APPELLANT'S ARGUMENTS ON REPLY 
Thomas' appeal should be granted for all of the reasons set forth in his first Appellant's 
Brief. Apparently fearing a reversal on the merits, the Appellees' main argument in opposition 
to this appeal is that Judge Young properly dismissed Thomas' second amended complaint due 
to an alleged failure by Thomas to prosecute. Thomas does not believe that this was the basis of 
Judge Young's ruling, but even if it were, it would be reversible error based upon the following 
facts: 
a. On April 12, 1991, Thomas filed a request for trial R. 258; 
b. On August 28, 1991, Thomas filed a request for ruling on the 
defendants/appellees' motion for summary judgment R. 306 ; 
c. On September 27, 1991, Judge Fuchs signed a Decision and Order in which he 
declined to rule on the motion for summary judgment, and sent the matter back to Judge Young 
for a ruling on the motion or for a trial setting R. 308; but 
d. Judge Young did not rule on the motion for years; and 
e. When Thomas attempted to get the actual court file in order to complete his 
docketing statement, the file was lost and could not be found for weeks. 
Judge Young — and now the Appellees — would like to shift the blame for Judge 
Young's failure to act on this motion, and for the fact that the Third District Court misplaced the 
file, on Thomas. But procedurally Thomas had done everything that he was required to do to 
move the case along. He not only asked for a trial setting in April of 1991, but also asked for a 
ruling on the motion for summary judgment in August of 1991. The ball was no longer in 
Thomas' court. When Judge Fuchs passed the ball to Judge Young and the Third District Court, 
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somehow the ball was dropped. Thomas should not be blamed for the fact that the Third District 
Court lost the file and that Judge Young failed to timely rule on the motion for summary 
judgment. At all times Thomas was ready, willing and able to proceed to trial, and had asked for 
the same to be scheduled. There was no dereliction on Thomas' part. A manifest injustice will 
occur if Judge Young's dismissal of Thomas' claims is affirmed on this basis. 
I. Appellees' Creative "Failure to Prosecute" Argument Should Be Rejected 
A. Judge Young's November 1997 Order Was Clearly In Error When It 
Stated that the 1990 Order Had Precluded Thomas From Bringing a Second Action for 
Interest and Attorney's Fees, and Other Matters. 
The Appellant's Brief in this matter quotes extensively from the transcript of the 1990 
Hearing and Judge Young's 1990 Order to demonstrate that said hearing and order clearly 
contemplated the filing of a second amended complaint for additional contractual interest and 
attorney's fees. Therefore, Judge Young's November 1997 Order stating that the Appellees' 
motion for summary judgment should be granted because the 1990 Order had resolved those 
issues was clearly in error. (See Appellant's Brief, pp. 26-27) Obviously the Appellees seek 
desperately for some other basis upon which to urge this Court to affirm Judge Young's ruling — 
and they believe that they have found it in their creative assertion that the underlying action was 
in actuality dismissed for failure to prosecute. 
B. Judge Young's November 1997 Order Does Refer to Inaction, But 
Does Not Make Failure to Prosecute a Basis for the Granting of the Defendants '/Appellees' 
Motion 
With respect to inaction in the case, Judge Young's November 1997 Order does state the 
following: 
"2. No activity has occurred in this matter since September 27, 1991, suggesting that the 
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parties consider this matter either to be resolved, or not to warrant further action." R. 338 
This language does not state that the Appellees' motion for summary judgment is granted 
due to a failure by Thomas to prosecute. In fact, it does not even state that Thomas failed to 
prosecute. Rather, this language clearly is mere commentary. Thomas respectfully suggests that 
this language is not sufficient to find that Judge Young granted the motion for summary 
judgment on the grounds that Thomas had culpably failed to prosecute the matter. 
C. It is Undisputed That Judge Young Failed to Rule on the Motion for 
Years -- But That Is Not Thomas' Fault. 
Judge Young's November 1997 was partially correct when it stated that no action had 
occurred from September of 1991 until Thomas insisted again that Judge Young rule on the 
matter. Despite the fact that Thomas had filed a request for trial setting and had asked for a 
ruling on the motion for summary judgment, and that Judge Fuchs had entered an order directing 
the matter to Judge Young for resolution — Judge Young failed to rule on the long pending 
motion or to schedule this matter for trial for years. At the May 1997 hearing, when Thomas' 
counsel tried to gently suggest that the file might have been lost by the Court -- which would be 
the only excuse for Judge Young's dereliction in failing to timely address this matter -- Judge 
Young exploded at Thomas' counsel. Appellees' brief fails to quote the entire exchange between 
Thomas' counsel and Judge Young in this regard, which was as follows: 
[Interrupting Thomas' counsel's argument] 
The Court: How can anybody think that this case was not over, when there's been no 
action in this case since 1991? 
I certainly thought the case was over. I thought it was resolved, and that the interest was 
paid. And my docket, unless I'm looking at the wrong docket, there were activities on this case 
before Judge Fuchs, and then activities before me. 
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And so that was in the Circuit Court at the time, which is now Division Two. But has 
there been any activity on this case recently, since 1991? 
Mr. (David) Steffensen: To answer you question, your honor, I'm not aware of any 
recently brought in the case. I think that the case basically got lost in limbo somewhere between 
the Circuit Court and this Court. I think that we had a pending resolution of the motion for 
summary judgment, 
[Again, Judge Young interrupts counsel] 
The Court: Cases don't get lost here. What happens is that if a case is thought to be 
active by the Court and there is no activity on the case in a six month period of time, there is an 
order to show cause issued as to why the case is not moving forward, and dates are set and the 
case is moved forward. There is no activity on this case because I believed, and everybody else 
believed, as far as I knew — except apparently you ~ that the cause was concluded with the Court 
order previously R. 351 at 7-8. 
The foregoing exchange is notable in several respects. Judge Young refused to accept 
the possibility that the case file did in fact get lost in limbo between the Circuit and District 
Courts. But the record is clear and unrefutable: Thomas did in fact request a trial setting, and 
did in fact request a ruling on the motion for summary judgment clear back in April and August 
of 1991. And Judge Fuchs did enter an order directing that the decision on these issues be made 
by Judge Young and remanded the matter to him. At that point in time, no one thought that the 
case was over. Everyone, including Judge Fuchs, knew that the case was clearly not over. 
Critical matters needed to be ruled upon. Rulings on those matters had been requested. But, 
Judge Young did not rule on the matter for years. Who should be penalized for that inaction? 
If the case had been properly transferred to Judge Young, one would think that he almost 
certainly would have docketed a hearing on the motion immediately. Or, in the alternative, if the 
case had gotten back on the Third District Court's calendering system, he would have done what 
he described above — within approximately six months of no action, he would have issued an 
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order to show cause why the cause should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute and a hearing 
on that order to show cause would have occurred. Judge Young did neither. Why? Because he 
was derelict? Because the Third District Court's calendaring system failed? Or was it because 
the case never got back on his calendar. It seems most likely that the case in fact became "lost in 
limbo" between the two courts. 
Again, who should be penalized for that? Probably no one -- and certainly not Thomas. 
Procedurally, Thomas did everything that he could do: he filed a request for trial setting, and he 
filed a request for ruling. The rules do not require a party to file multiple such documents. This 
matter should be resolved on the merits, and not because somehow the Circuit and District 
Courts did not communicate well with one another in this particular situation. 
The factual background of this case is, therefore, completely different and distinguishable 
from that found in the cases cited by the Appellees in their brief There are no cases where a 
litigant has been held responsible, after he has requested a ruling on a matter, for a delay caused 
thereafter by the Court itself losing the file. 
II. The Appellees' Other Arguments Are Similarly Without Merit 
The Appellees assert that because Thomas admits that there might have been some 
minimal instances of hearsay in his affidavits, that he has somehow admitted that said affidavits 
were so deficient as to be stricken in their entirety. This argument is facially senseless. Thomas 
stands on his prior arguments in favor of his request that the order striking said affidavits be set 
aside. 
There was only "no admissible evidence" opposing the appellees' first motion to dismiss 
because Judge Young had improperly stricken Thomas' voluminous affidavits. Those affidavits 
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should not have been stricken in their entirety, and if they had not been stricken, Judge Young's 
granting of the motion to dismiss was in error. 
With respect to the disqualification of Brian Steffensen, the cases cited by Thomas in his 
brief in opposition clearly demonstrate that under the circumstances of this case, given the 
hardship imposed upon Thomas, etc., the proper course of action would have been to allow Brian 
Steffensen to act as counsel up until the point of trial. However, Judge Young did not allow this 
because, in Thomas' opinion given everything that has happened in this case, Judge Young felt 
that by disqualifying Brian Steffensen it would further his scheme to disembowel Thomas' action 
to such an extent as to motivate Thomas to accept only the $22,000 plus bank interest which 
Judge Young had gotten 3D Communications to agree to pay immediately, and go away. 
Thomas should have been allowed to keep Brian Steffensen as his counsel up until the point of 
trial. 
Finally, Thomas wants to make it completely clear that he never stipulated to the relief 
that Judge Young granted in 1990. Judge Young signed orders which state that the $22,000 
payment was pursuant to the parties stipulation, but that was incorrect and objected to by 
Thomas. 
Otherwise, Thomas believes that his Appellant's Brief is persuasive on all issues. 
Conclusion and Summary of Relief Sought 
For the foregoing reasons, the Appellant Allan B. Thomas, respectfully requests that his 
appeal be granted as follows: 
1. That Judge Young's 1990 order striking Thomas' Affidavits opposing the 
Appellees' motion to dismiss be set aside; 
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2. That with said affidavits "unstricken," Judge Young's 1990 order 
dismissing Thomas' complaint be set aside and Thomas be allowed to proceed on the claims set 
forth therein against all the named defendants; 
3. In the alternative, that Judge Young's 1997 order dismissing the Second 
Amended Complaint be set aside and this matter be allowed to proceed to trial at the very least 
on those limited issues; and 
4. That Judge Young's order disqualifying Brian Steffensen as counsel be set 
aside to the extent that it disallows Brian Steffensen from acting as Thomas' counsel up until the 
point in trial. 
DATED the 2nd day of November, 1998. 
Steffensen • M<cDetfiald • Steffensen 
Attorney for Appel* 
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